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INTRODUCTION
In 2002 the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (the CPPA)1 on the grounds that its
provisions were unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore violative of
* B.A., The University of Wisconsin at Madison, 2005; Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law
School, 2008; Articles Editor, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Volume 17. I am
grateful to Augusta Wilson, Maria Hroncich and Jaime Senior for their thoughtful editing and
suggestions. I also wish to thank my parents for their unending encouragement and support.
I Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat.
3009-26 (1996).
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the First Amendment. 2 Specifically, the Court found, in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, that the statutory language prohibiting virtual child
pornography -computer-generated images designed to resemble actual
children or youthful adults depicted as minors-swept too broadly and
prohibited constitutionally protected speech.3 In striking those provi-
sions, the Court rejected the government's secondary-effects argument
that such depictions encourage child sexual abuse by whetting the appe-
tites of pedophiles and luring children to participate in sexual acts.4 Ad-
ditionally, the Court dismissed the government's claim that juries
struggle to distinguish between actual and virtual children and that, be-
cause it can be very difficult to distinguish between actual and virtual
child pornography, if virtual child pornography is not banned, it might
provide a convenient defense for those charged with using actual chil-
dren in the production of pornography. 5 Lastly, the Court reasoned that
the CPPA did not properly regulate obscenity because the statute could
easily be used to prosecute depictions that are not offensive to a
community. 6
Congress responded to the Free Speech Coalition decision by pass-
ing the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation
of Children Today Act of 2003 (the PROTECT Act).7 The PROTECT
Act is designed to successfully combat the ills of child pornography,
while satisfying the constitutional requirements of free expression out-
lined by the Court in Free Speech Coalition.8 In justifying the PRO-
TECT Act, Congress largely abandons the secondary effects argument it
relied so heavily upon in defending the CPPA, and instead emphasizes
that the legalization of virtual child pornography hampers prosecutions
for child pornography. 9
While many agree that the revised statute complies with the stan-
dards set forth in Free Speech Coalition, in reality the exact parameters
of that standard remain uncertain. For example, the Court in Free
Speech Coalition emphasized that the goal of prosecuting child pornog-
raphy is to prevent harm to children, 10 but it did not specifically define
"harm." Similarly, the Court 'did not make clear where the line between
"virtual" and "real" should be drawn. It did not consider, for example,
2 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
3 Id. at 256-58.
4 Id. at 251-54.
5 Id. at 249.
6 Id. at 254-56.
7 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
8 Id.
9 Id.
1O Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 249-50.
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the issue of morphing innocent, non-sexual photographs of real children
into pornographic images.
Despite these legal battles, child pornography industry continues to
develop and to create increasingly realistic images due to advancements
in digital technology. In light of these developments, this note will ad-
dress the increasing complexities facing those prosecuting and adjudging
child pornography cases and will argue that computer savvy
pornographers armed with budding technology may exploit the Court's
ban on prohibitions of virtual child pornography by arguing that the real
children depicted are actually virtual. Specifically, this note will argue,
in Part IV, that statutes regulating virtual child pornography as obscenity
will and should be upheld by the Supreme Court, and further, that such
laws are sufficiently broad to prevent the harmful effects of virtual child
pornography. But before delving into that debate, this note provides
some background on pornography litigation and legislation. Part I de-
scribes the history of obscenity and pornography regulation and jurispru-
dence. Part II examines the Supreme Court's opinion in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition. Part III analyzes subsequent Congressional efforts to
regulate virtual child pornography, namely the PROTECT Act of 2003.
Finally, in Part IV, this note will consider what forms of child pornogra-
phy are obscene, and if all child pornography can or should be found
obscene under the Miller v. California standard, which asks whether the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lacks serious
literary, artistic, politic or scientific value.' 1
I. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM AND
THE LAW
A. THE PROBLEM: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY.
By the mid-1980s, federal enforcement had nearly eliminated child
pornography trafficking.' 2 The production of child pornography was
costly and difficult, and the exchange of child pornography was ex-
tremely risky.' 3 The industry declined because pornographers and
pedophiles could not easily find and interact with one another and still
I Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
12 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section: Child Pornography,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminallceos/childporn.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
t3 Id.
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remain anonymous to federal law enforcement.14 However, all that
changed with the advent of computer technology. 15
The intemet allowed pedophiles to congregate and to share porno-
graphic depictions of children easily and at little cost. 16 Greater accessi-
bility and anonymity meant that child pornography could be
disseminated at an unprecedented rate. 17 Today, websites, e-mail, instant
messaging, chat rooms, newsgroups, bulletin boards, and peer-to-peer
networks all serve as means by which pedophiles may disseminate or
receive child pomography.1 8
In addition to making it easier to share actual child pornography, the
explosion of computer technology gave rise to virtual child pornogra-
phy. 19 This pornography utilizes computer-generated images designed to
resemble children and may also feature adults who appear to be minors20
or "morphed images," which are innocent images of children digitally
distorted into pornography. 21 Important here is the fact that while some
pedophiles may primarily use child pornography to gratify themselves,
others will use such images to justify their pathology and to convince
children to willingly participate in sexual acts.22 Thus, although the pro-
duction of virtual child pornography does not directly harm actual chil-
dren, it may have undesirable secondary effects.
B. THE HISTORY OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.
Pornography jurisprudence is rooted in the Court's treatment of ob-
scenity. 23 While the First Amendment to the Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech," the
Court has long held that the protections of the First Amendment are not
absolute. 24 In particular, the Court ruled in Miller v. California that lewd
and obscene speech does not receive First Amendment protection be-
cause obscenity serves no crucial role in the exposition of ideas and has
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See id.
18 Id.
19 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239-40 (2002).
20 Id. at 234.
21 Id. at 242.
22 Id. at 241.
23 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982).
24 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (noting that obscen-
ity, libel, profanity, and fighting words are undeserving of First Amendment protection).
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little social value.25 The challenge is ascertaining what constitutes
obscenity.
In Miller, the Court set out a standard that defined obscene
speech.26 The Court developed a balancing test that asks:
(a) [W]hether "the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards" would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; ... (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently of-
fensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value. 27
The Court observed that this standard is sensitive to the value sexual
depictions might have in serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
works28 and that it takes into account the values of the community in
which the work was produced.2 9
Notably, Miller did not overrule the Court's decision in Stanley v.
Georgia.30 In Stanley the Court ruled that the government could not pro-
hibit possession of obscene materials, reasoning that such regulations
amounted to government mind control. 31
In light of Miller, Congress enacted the Protection of Children
Against Exploitation Act of 1977,32 which made illegal the use of chil-
dren under the age of sixteen in sexually explicit material.33 However,
the statute only dealt with commercial sale, and not mere trading.34 Fur-
ther, it penalized only those materials found obscene under the Miller v.
California standard. 35
Then, in New York v. Ferber, the Court held that child pornography
involving actual children is a category of speech not protected by the
Constitution and that such depictions may be prohibited despite the fact
that they are not obscene. 36 The Court offered five justifications for dis-
allowing child pornography. 37 First, the Court noted that the use of chil-
25 Miller, 413 U.S. at 25-26.
26 Id. at 24-25.
27 Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
28 Id. at 25-26.
29 Id at 30, 33.
30 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
31 Id. at 559.
32 Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (2000)).
33 Id. § 2251; see also S. RFr,. No. 95-438, at 5 (1977).
34 18 U.S.C. § 2251. The Act also prohibited the trafficking of juveniles for the purpose
of prostitution. Id.
35 Id.
36 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-61 (1982).
37 Id. at 756-64.
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dren in pornographic depictions is harmful to the physical, emotional,
and mental health of the child and that this comprises a compelling gov-
ernment interest that warrants regulation. 38 Second, the Court found that
the Miller standard for determining what is legally obscene does not ade-
quately encompass the less extreme sexual depictions that child pornog-
raphy includes.39 Third, the Court observed that the advertising and
selling of child pornography provides an economic incentive for the pro-
duction of such material; a crime throughout the United States.40 Fourth,
the Court noted that the value of photographic depictions of children en-
gaged in sexual acts is small, if not de minimis.41 Lastly, the Court rea-
soned that recognizing child pornography as a category of unprotected
speech was consistent with prior decisions limiting the First Amendment
where the government's interest was especially strong and the value of
the speech was minimal.42
Later, Congress enacted the Child Protection Act of 1984. 43 This
statute reflected the insufficiency of previous legislation, which had re-
sulted in only one conviction since 1978. 44 It raised the protected age
from sixteen to eighteen, 45 eliminated the requirement that the material
be obscene, 46 and removed the requirement that material be made or dis-
tributed for the purpose of commercial sale. 47 Subsequently, the Child
Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986 prohibited advertisements
the violator knew to be related to depictions of sexually explicit conduct
by a minor from being mailed or otherwise transported in interstate or
38 Id. at 756-59.
39 Id. at 759-61.
40 Id. at 761-62.
41 Id. at 762-63.
42 Id. at 763-64.
43 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-55 (West Supp. 2007)).
44 Arr'y GEN.'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT 604 (1986) [hereinafter Fi-
NAL REPORT]. Before such legislation, the Attorney General encouraged tougher enforcement
and regulation of child pornography. See id.; see also Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of
Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 439 (1997)
(offering a detailed analysis of the history of congressional regulation of child pornography
and examining the sufficiency and breadth of state interest).
45 98 Stat. 204.
46 Id.
47 Id.; see also United States v. Andersson, 803 F.2d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that Congress intended that the Act penalize those who distribute child pornography, regard-
less of commercial motive); United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841,846 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the Act does not exempt those who use but do not distribute child pornography). Con-
gress's elimination of the obscenity requirement reflects the Supreme Court's holding in New
York v. Ferber that child pornography is an unprotected category of speech. See 458 U.S. 747
(1982).
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foreign commerce. 4 8 Additionally, the Child Abuse Victim's Rights Act
of 1986 made such violators personally liable to their minor victims. 49
Congress first addressed the connection between the rapidly devel-
oping computer industry and child pornography in the Child Protection
and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988. 50 This legislation penalizes the
use of computers in offering to buy or sell control of a minor for the
purpose of sexually explicit conduct. 51
In 1990, the Court in Osborne v. Ohio upheld an Ohio statute
criminalizing mere possession of child pornography. 52 There, the defen-
dant argued that there was insufficient state interest to criminalize mere
possession and that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. 53 The
Court cited evidence that pedophiles use child pornography to convince
non-depicted children to willingly engage in sexual acts. 54 The Court
found that the protection of both depicted and non-depicted children was
a legitimate and compelling governmental interest, and therefore, unlike
prohibitions of obscenity, prohibitions of child pornography were consti-
tutional. 55 Additionally, the Court acknowledged that Congress has a
legitimate and compelling interest in eliminating the market for child
pornography. 56
Finally, in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 57 the Supreme
Court interpreted the Protection Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
197758 to contain a scienter requirement.59 Although the statute was am-
biguous on that point,60 the Court reasoned that a contrary rule would
penalize distributors who did not know the material they were selling
48 Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat.
3510 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2255 (West Supp. 2007)).
49 Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783, 74-75
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (West Supp. 2007)).
50 Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 7512, 102 Stat. 4485, 4486 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251A (West Supp. 2007));
see also John C. Scheller, Note, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy, and Child Pornography,
27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 989, 1009-10 (1994).
51 Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act § 7512.
52 495 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1990).
53 Id. at 107, 110-12.
54 Id. at I11.
55 Id. at 109-11. Under this rule, factors beyond the direct harm to depicted children
could have constituted a compelling governmental interest where child pornography was con-
cerned. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[C]onsiderations beyond
preventing the direct abuse of actual children can qualify as compelling government objectives
where child pornography is concerned.").
56 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110.
57 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
58 Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (West
Supp. 2007)).
59 A scienter requirement provides that the person possess knowledge of the nature of his
or her act or omission. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
60 X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68-69.
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was pornographic. 61 Further, the Court noted that it was judicial practice
to presume a scienter requirement for offenses against public morals.62
Shortly thereafter, Congress acknowledged the phenomenon of vir-
tual child pornography. 63 It found that depictions of child sexual activity
that were indistinguishable from depictions of actual children were just
as likely to successfully aid pedophiles in molesting children as depic-
tions of actual children.64 Further, Congress concluded that a blanket
ban on all forms of child pornography would encourage pedophiles to
destroy such material, thereby reducing the market for the sexual ex-
ploitation of children. 65 Lastly, Congress noted that technological ad-
vances in digital image editing meant that those charged with possession
of actual child pornography would argue that such images were virtual,
and that eventually the two types of images would be indistinguishable. 66
Therefore, Congress concluded it would be impossible for the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the pornography depicted actual
children.67
In light of these findings, Congress passed the Child Pornography
Prevention Act in 1996 (the CPPA).68 The statute expanded the defini-
tion of child pornography to include any depiction that "is, or appears to
be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. ' 69 Additionally,
the statute proscribed the marketing of child pornography, making the
advertisement, promotion, presentation, description, or distribution of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct illegal. 70 Lastly, the CPPA
permitted an affirmative defense requiring a defendant to prove that the
depictions at issue featured only adults and that the defendant did not
convey the impression that the images were of actual children. 71
II. THE CASE: ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION
In 1997, the Free Speech Coalition, a California trade association
representing the adult-entertainment industry, challenged the constitu-
tionality of the CPPA in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
61 Id. at 69.
62 Id. at 70-72.
63 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat.
3009, 26-31; see also S. REP. No. 104-358 (1996).
64 S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2.
65 Id. at 3.
66 Id. at 16, 20.
67 Id.
68 Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121.
69 § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009-28.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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of California.72 The adult entertainment association argued that section
2256(8)(B) of the CPPA prohibiting "any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer generated image or picture
[that] is, or appears to be, of a minor participating in a sexually explicit
conduct" violated the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech.73 Additionally, the association challenged the constitutionality
of section 2256(8)(D) of the CPPA that defined child pornography to
include any sexually explicit image that was "advertised, promoted,
presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
impression" it contains "a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.
' 7 4
The association claimed that its members did not use children in
their pornographic works, but that they believed some of these works
might nonetheless be prohibited under the CPPA's expansive definition
of child pornography. 75 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California disagreed and awarded summary judgment to the govern-
ment.76 The district court noted that it was highly unlikely that adapta-
tions of sexually explicit literary or artistic works would be penalized.77
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the
challenged provisions were substantially overbroad and prohibited
materials that were neither obscene nor produced using actual children.78
The court reasoned that Congress could not ban this kind of speech be-
cause of its tendency to persuade viewers to commit crimes.79 A dissent-
ing judge, however, opined that virtual child pornography, like obscenity
and pornography using real children, should be treated as a category of
72 Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, No. C 97-0281VSC, 1997 WL 487758 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
1997), affid in part, rev'd in part, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), pet. for rehearing en bank
denied, 220 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000), affd sub nom. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S.
234 (2002).
73 Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 241.
74 Id. at 257.
75 Id. at 243. Other respondents in the suit included "Bold Type, Inc., the publisher of a
book advocating the nudist lifestyle; Jim Gingerich, a painter of nudes; and Ron Raffaelli, a
photographer specializing in erotic images." Id.
76 Id.; see also Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 1997 WL 487758 (issuing summary judgment
in favor of the government in response to plaintiff's challenge to the constitutionality of the
Child Pornography Protection Act).
77 Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 243 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Free Speech
Coal., 538 U.S. 510, 62a-63a (No. 00-795)).
78 Id. (citing Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999)). The
Court of Appeals voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc over the dissent of three
judges. Id. at 243-44 (citing Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 220 F.3d 1113, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000)).
79 Id. at 243.
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speech not protected by the First Amendment. 80 Four other circuit courts
agreed with the 9th Circuit dissenter's reasoning and sustained the act. 81
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion authored by
Justice Kennedy, agreed with the Ninth Circuit and held the CPPA con-
stitutionally invalid on its face. 82 The Court reasoned that the material
prohibited by the CPPA was neither obscenity under the Miller standard
nor pornography depicting actual children engaged in sexual acts, as dic-
tated by Ferber.83 The Court found that the CPPA was unconstitution-
ally overbroad on its face because it prohibited a substantial amount of
protected speech.84
First, upon examining section 2256(8)(B), the "appears to be" pro-
vision of the CPPA, the Court reasoned that the CPPA did not regulate
obscenity because it extended to material involving minors engaged in
sexual activity without regard to the Miller requirements. 85 In particular,
the Court noted that the CPPA did not require that material appeal to the
prurient interest or contravene community standards but rather that it
merely contain sexually explicit activity involving minors.8 6 Further, the
Court observed that the CPPA did not demand that prohibited images be
patently offensive. 87 Justice Kennedy explained that under the CPPA,
creators of works depicting seventeen year-olds engaging in sexual activ-
ity could be prosecuted, despite the fact that such behavior is common-
place in society and such images are generally accepted as valid in art
and literature. 88 He reasoned that such works are not patently offensive
as required by Miller.89 Justice Kennedy found that such works had ar-
tistic or literary redeeming value, noting that even films that merely ex-
plored teenage sexuality and did not contain child actors could be
prosecuted under the statute.90 Finally, the Court reasoned that the
CPPA could not be said to regulate obscenity because its prohibitions of
child pornography were not related to community standards, as required
by Miller.91
80 Id. (citing Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1097 (Ferguson, J., dissenting)).
81 Id. at 244 (citing United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11 th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, (1st Cir. 1999) cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999)).
82 Id. at 234.
83 Id. at 246-51.
84 Id. at 258.
85 Id. at 246.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 246-47.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 247-48. Justice Kennedy pointed to contemporary, critically-acclaimed films
such as Traffic and American Beauty as examples of the value of artistic depictions of teenage
sexuality in modem society. Id.
91 Id. at 248-49.
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However, the Court did add that:
While we have not had occasion to consider the ques-
tion, we may assume that the apparent age of persons
engaged in sexual conduct is relevant to whether a depic-
tion offends community standards. Pictures of young
children engaged in certain acts might be obscene where
similar depictions of adults, or perhaps even older ado-
lescents, would not.92
Nevertheless, the Court held that the CPPA was not directed at obscenity
and that obscene materials are regulated by a separate statute. 93
Second, the Court held that the CPPA could not be found constitu-
tional under Ferber because it covered material that was not directly con-
nected to the sexual abuse of children. 94 Justice Kennedy noted that,
unlike Ferber, where the prohibited material was determined to be "in-
trinsically related" to the sexual abuse of children, pornography that does
not utilize actual children in its production does not serve as a permanent
record of a child's abuse, nor does the ongoing circulation of such mate-
rial harm actual children. 95 While the government argued that the
images could lead to instances of child abuse, the Court responded that
any causal link was attenuated and that subsequent harm depended upon
a viewer's immeasurable capacity to commit subsequent illegal acts.96
Still, the government contended that even these indirect harms were suf-
ficient because, as Ferber acknowledged, child pornography is rarely
valuable speech. 97 The Court, however, rejected this contention on two
grounds. Justice Kennedy reasoned first that Ferber dealt with the pro-
duction of child pornography and not the message it communicated, and
second that Ferber did not hold that child pornography is by definition
without value.98 He noted that Ferber recognized some child pornogra-
phy as having significant value and that the very images prohibited by
the CPPA were acknowledged as alternative ways to create literary and
artistic works that explore the sexuality of minors without using actual
minors in the production of pornographic works.99 Thus, the Court
found, Ferber provided no support for a statute which rid the distinction
between virtual and actual child pornography, penalizing the former as
well as the latter.1°°
92 Id. at 240.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 249-51 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982)).
95 Id. at 249-50.
96 Id. at 250.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 250-51.
99 Id. at 251.
100 Id.
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Despite the Court holding that CPPA was inconsistent with both
Miller and Ferber, the government sought to justify the prohibitions on
other grounds. 101 First, the government contended that the statute was
necessary because pedophiles may use virtual child pornography to con-
vince minors to engage in sexual activity. 10 2 In particular, the govern-
ment argued that virtual child pornography may be shown to children
reluctant to engage in sexual activity as evidence that other children are
"having fun" performing similar acts. 10 3 The Court, however, rejected
this argument, noting that cartoons, video games, and candy could all be
used to entice children to engage in sexual acts but that such items could
not reasonably be prohibited merely because of their potential for mis-
use.1°4 The Court noted that the Government is free to penalize adults
who provide unsuitable materials to children, but that it cannot ban
speech appropriate for adults simply because it may reach children. 10 5
Second, the government asserted that virtual pornography "whets
the appetites of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal con-
duct." 106 The Court dismissed this argument as well, reasoning that that
the tendency of speech to encourage illegal acts is not a valid reason to
prohibit it.107 Justice Kennedy emphasized the Court's long-standing
recognition of the distinction between words and deeds, or ideas and con-
duct.108 While Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the government may
regulate speech that incites imminent lawless action and is likely to pro-
duce such action, he noted that here, the government had shown at best a
remote link between speech that might encourage thoughts leading to
child abuse and that such an attenuated link was insufficient to sustain
the statute. 109
Third, the government argued that prohibition of virtual child por-
nography was necessary to eliminate the market for child pornography
using actual children. 110 In particular, the government contended that
virtual images are indistinguishable from images of real children and are
part of the same market and are often traded."' However, the Court
responded that if virtual images were indeed indistinguishable from real
101 Id. at 251-55.
102 Id. at 251-52.
103 Id. at 241.
104 Id. at 251.
105 Id. at 252-53.
106 Id. at 253.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 253-54.
110 Id. at 254.
1'' Id.
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ones, few pornographers would risk criminal sanction by abusing real
children when artificial, computerized images would suffice. 112
Lastly, the government argued that the existence of virtual child
pornography makes it more difficult to prosecute pornographers who do
produce material using actual children.1 13 The government cited expert
findings that suggested it is difficult to determine whether a given image
depicts actual children or was created using computer technology. 114
Thus, the government claimed, prohibition of both types of pornography
was necessary to prevent defendants in possession of pornography show-
ing actual children from evading criminal sanction by arguing that such
images are computer generated. 115 The Court found this argument un-
convincing as well, noting that the purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is
to ensure that the government may not ban lawful speech as a means to
eliminate unlawful speech.116
To escape the reach of Court's objection, the government responded
that the Court should read the CPPA as a law, shifting the burden to the
accused to prove the speech is lawful and not, as a statute, prohibiting
expression. 1 7 In particular, the government pointed to the affirmative
defense provided by the statute that allowed the defendants to avoid con-
viction for non-possession offenses by demonstrating that "the materials
were produced using only adults and were not otherwise distributed in a
manner conveying the impression that they depicted real children." 1 8
The Court, however, found this affirmative defense to be incomplete and
insufficient. It noted that the government poses serious constitutional
difficulties by shifting the burden to the defendant to prove that his
speech is not unlawful. 19 The Court reasoned that some defendants may
endure substantial hardship in demonstrating that the speech in question
is lawful. 120 For instance, where the defendant did not produce the work
himself, he may have no way of proving the identity or existence of the
actors.' 2 ' Further, the Court explained that even producers themselves
may not have maintained the records necessary to satisfy the burden of
proof. 122 "Even if an affirmative defense can save a statute from First
Amendment challenge," the Court expounded, "here the defense is in-
112 Id.
113 Id.
'"4 Id.
115 Id. at 254-55.
116 Id. at 255.
117 Id.
118 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2006)).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 255-56.
121 Id. at 255.
122 Id. at 256.
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complete and insufficient, even on its own terms."'' 23 Justice Kennedy
noted that defendants charged with possessing, as opposed to distribut-
ing, prohibited works could not avail themselves of the affirmative de-
fense, even if the images they possessed feature only adult actors. 124
Additionally, the Court found that the affirmative defense provided no
protection to defendants who produce images using computer technology
or other means that do not depict adult actors as minors. 125 Therefore,
the Court concluded that the affirmative defense was insufficient to sus-
tain the CPPA. 126
Finally, the Court examined section 2256(8)(D), the provision of the
CPPA that prohibited pornography "advertised, promoted, presented, de-
scribed, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that
the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexu-
ally explicit conduct." 127 The government claimed that the difference
between this provision and section 2256(8)(B) was that "the 'conveys the
impression' provision requires the jury to assess the material at issue in
light of the manner in which it is promoted," but that such a determina-
tion would depend primarily upon the content of the proscribed work.' 28
The Court, however, replied that the jury's analysis would require little
judgment about the content of the work beyond determining that the
work is sexually explicit.' 29 Rather, the Court reasoned, the CPPA pro-
hibited sexually explicit works that do not contain youthful actors or
images simply because they are packaged or promoted as depicting the
sexuality of minors and, further, criminalized possession of such images
even where the possessor realizes that the work was mislabeled. 130 Thus,
the Court concluded, section 2256(8)(D) was also overbroad and in vio-
lation of the First Amendment. 131
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas acknowledged the government's
asserted interest in assuring that those defendants who possess and dis-
tribute pornographic materials depicting real children do not escape con-
viction by asserting that the images they possess are computer generated,
thereby raising a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. 132 However, Justice
Thomas maintained that imaging technology was not yet sophisticated
enough to create images identical to real children, noting that no defen-
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (2006)).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 257 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D)).
128 Id. (quoting Brief for the Petitioners at 18, n.3, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535
U.S. 234 (2002) (No. 00-795)).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 258.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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dant had been shown to have been acquitted based on a "virtual defense,"
and that given this, such a speculative interest could not support a statute
as expansive as the CPPA. 133 Having said as much, Justice Thomas ac-
knowledged that technology may develop to the point where it becomes
impossible for the prosecution to demonstrate that a pornographic image
is of a real child, and that under those circumstances, it may be appropri-
ate for the government to regulate virtual child pornography.134
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, with whom Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia joined, found that the CPPA's prohibition against
virtual child pornography was not overbroad. 135 In particular, Justice
O'Connor asserted that the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography did
not fail strict scrutiny because the Government has a compelling interest
in protecting the nation's children that is furthered by efforts to combat
sexual predators and real child pornography. 136 Justice O'Connor recog-
nized the effects of virtual child pornography, noting that such images
whet the appetites of pedophiles are used to seduce children and may be
utilized as means for defendants charged with possession of real child
pornography to escape criminal sanction. 137 Like Justice Thomas, Jus-
tice O'Connor acknowledged that rapidly developing computer technol-
ogy may soon produce virtual images that are indistinguishable from
images of real children.' 38 Further, while Justice O'Connor agreed with
the majority that the CPPA's prohibition of youthful adult pornography
violated the First Amendment, she maintained that the CPPA drew a
meaningful distinction between the two classes of pornography, virtual
child pornography and youthful adult pornography, by providing an af-
firmative defense for the latter but not the former. 139
133 Id.
134 Id. Justice Thomas also commented that the Court left open the possibility that a
broader affirmative defense could make a statute constitutional. Id. However, he qualified that
by stating that he "would not prejudge ... whether a more complete affirmative defense is the
only way to narrlowly tailor a criminal statute that prohibits the possession and dissemination
of virtual child pornography." Id. at 260 (Thomas, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 263 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 264 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In light of this fact Justice O'Connor argued that
the Court should read the "appears to be" provision of the CPPA as meaning "virtually indis-
tinguishable from" so that the provision would not cover sexually explicit cartoons or statues
of children. Id. Justice O'Connor reasoned that this narrower interpretation would avoid the
constitutional hurdles of overbreadth and lack of narrow tailoring. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
139 Id. at 266-67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In light of her reasoning, Justice O'Connor
concluded that she would reject the CPPA's prohibition of material that "conveys the impres-
sion" that it contains real child pornography, but would uphold the prohibition on porno-
graphic images that "appear to be" of children so long as it is not directed at youthful adult
pornography. Id. at 267 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, asserted that he
would have reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and held the CPPA
to be constitutional in its entirety. 140 Justice Rehnquist maintained that
the CPPA could be interpreted to reach only those images virtually indis-
tinguishable from images of real children. 141 Notwithstanding Justice
Rehnquist's dissent, however, the Court ruled that the CPPA was uncon-
stitutional, and suggested that Congress should draft a narrower law in
order to comply with the First Amendment.
III. HERE WE GO AGAIN: THE PROTECT ACT OF 2003
A. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS SUPPORT THE AMENDED LEGISLATION.
After the Free Speech Coalition decision was issued, both houses of
Congress scrambled to enact legislation that would pass constitutional
muster but still effectively combat child pornography. 142 Congress
deemphasized the secondary-effects argument that it had advanced in
favor of prohibiting virtual child pornography and instead, taking a cue
from Justice Thomas's concurrence, focused on the likelihood that a de-
fense of virtual pornography could inhibit prosecutions for actual child
pornography. 143 Specifically, Congress pointed to post-Free Speech Co-
alition cases in which a defendant had successfully argued that the al-
leged child pornography was actually a virtual creation. 144 Further, the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) testified
in front of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime
(Subcommittee).145 In its testimony, NCMEC displayed both real and
virtual pictures, demonstrating their similarity. The Subcommittee found
that an ordinary person viewing the pictures would find it difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish between real and virtual images. 46 In fact, the
technical components of digital images of real and virtual children are
identical and, as a result, even a skilled expert might not be able to sepa-
140 Id. at 267-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
142 See S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 4623, 107th
Cong. (2002). The House versions of the proposed amended legislation were titled the Child
Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Acts of 2002 and 2003 (COPPA). See H.R. 1161;
H.R. 4623. The Senate version was labeled the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT), eventually the title of the
enacted bill. See S. 151; H.R. 1161.
143 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(9), 117 Stat. 650, 677 (2003) ("After [the
1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Free Speech Coalition,] prosecutions gener-
ally have been brought in the Ninth Circuit only in ... a fraction of meritorious child pornog-
raphy cases.").
144 S. REP. No. 108-2, at 4-5 (2003).
145 Id. at 5.
146 Id.
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rate virtual from real.147 The difficulty in identifying child victims is
only further complicated by the global nature of the child pornography
industry 48 and by the anonymity of the internet.' 49 Thus, Congress con-
cluded that the availability of a virtual defense could create a reasonable
doubt as to the authenticity of alleged child pornography in every
case.1 50 Lastly, NCMEC, who maintains a database of sexually ex-
ploited children, asserted that since Free Speech Coalition, they had been
contacted by numerous prosecutors threatening to drop child pornogra-
phy charges if the NCMEC could not identify the minors pictured.1 5'
NCMEC further testified that many prosecutions were in fact dismissed
as a result of prosecutors being unable to identify the depicted
children. 152
Additionally, Congress found that while a defense of virtual child
pornography might prove successful, it is essentially illusory because
most child pornography utilizes real children.' 53 Experts testified before
Congress that, while the computer technology exists to create virtual
images, it is a time consuming and expensive process and that child por-
nography depicting actual children is more cost-effective. 54 Neverthe-
less, Congress feared that producers and distributors might hamper
prosecutions by making subtle and inexpensive computer enhancements
to images, thereby rendering children unidentifiable or implying that they
are virtually produced. 55
147 See id.; see also Timothy J. Perla, Note, Attempting to End the Cycle of Virtual Por-
nography Prohibitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1218 (2003) (asserting that there is no absolute
difference between real and virtual images because both are essentially comprised of a mere
aggregation of indistinguishable data); Webopedia.com, Definition of Digital, http://
www.webopedia.com/TERM/d/digital.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).
148 See Yaman Akdeniz, International Developments Section of Regulation of Child Por-
nography on the Internet: Cases and Materials, http://www.cyber-rights.org/reports/in-
terdev.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (describing arrests for child pornography abroad)
[hereinafter International Developments].
149 See Perla, supra note 147, at 1222-24. Perla explains that the only records of online
pornography trading are logs. Id. at 1222. Computer servers manage logs in order to bill their
users, to keep track of how many "hits" they receive, or to identify computer hackers. Id. at
1222-23. Logs detail where a file came from and where it went. Id. at 1223. However, since
logs utilize a great deal of memory, they are often discarded. Id. Further, servers sometimes
choose to log only certain activities, thus it is possible to exchange pornography without being
logged. Id. In fact, sophisticated users may encrypt the files they send, thereby concealing
their identities, their crimes, or both. Id. at 1224.
150 S. Rep. No. 108-2, at 5 (2003).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 S. Rep. No. 108-2, at 6.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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B. THE LAW Is ENACTED AS THE PROTECT ACT.
Ultimately, the House and Senate versions of the amended legisla-
tion were combined and passed as the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (the PRO-
TECT Act). 156 While the PROTECT Act retains many of the provisions
of the CPPA, it makes several critical changes to satisfy the parameters
of Free Speech Coalition.157 First, the PROTECT Act amends the defi-
nition of child pornography under § 2256(8)(B) to include any digital
image "that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct." 158 Thus, the PROTECT Act discards the "ap-
pears to be" and "conveys the impression" language that the Court
deemed unconstitutional in Free Speech Coalition, choosing language
that reaches substantially less material because it requires that there be
no arguable difference between the alleged image and that of a real
child.159 Additionally, Congress defined "sexually explicit conduct," as
used in the statute, as "graphic" sexual conduct. 160
Second, Congress removed the pandering provision from the defini-
tion of child pornography 16' and drafted a separate section prohibiting
only virtual images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct that
are knowingly advertised, promoted, presented, distributed or solicited in
a manner that reflects the belief, or are intended to cause another to be-
lieve, that they are obscene.' 62 Thus, by permitting virtual depictions of
non-graphic sexually explicit conduct and allowing promotion of non-
obscene works, Congress remedied the overbreadth problem and ensured
that award-winning films like American Beauty and Traffic were not
targeted by the statute.163 Finally, by adding a knowledge requirement,
Congress protects individuals in possession of materials pandered as
child pornography by someone earlier in the distribution chain so long as
those individuals do not pander the materials as or believe that the mater-
ials are child pornography .164
Lastly, the PROTECT Act expands the affirmative defense provided
by the CPPA, which had been previously available only to the
pornographers who used "youthful-looking adults" in their images and
films. 165 This amendment reflects the Court's suggestion in Free Speech
156 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000).
157 Id. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
158 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B).
159 See id. § 2256(8)(B)-(D); 535 U.S. at 241, 257.
160 Id. § 2256(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
161 See id. § 2256(8)(D) (repealed 2003).
162 Id. § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
163 See id. § 2252(8)(B); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 247-48.
164 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a); see also Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258.
165 See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256.
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Coalition that a more complete affirmative defense might save the stat-
ute. 166 Under the amended version of § 2252A(c), persons charged
under the provisions of the PROTECT Act prohibiting the trafficking,
possession with the intent to sell, and mere possession of child pornogra-
phy may assert an affirmative defense if "(1) (A) the alleged child por-
nography was produced using an actual person or persons engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and (B) each such person was an adult at the
time the material was produced; or (2) the alleged child pornography was
not produced using any actual minor or minors."'167 Thus, the statute no
longer bans virtual child pornography and instead focuses exclusively on
images of actual children. However, the amended affirmative defense
continues to place the burden on a defendant to demonstrate that the por-
nography at issue does not depict an actual child and further, is not avail-
able to those charged with pandering under § 2252A(a)(3)(B). Thus, a
defendant charged with possession is still required to demonstrate that
the images at issue do not depict actual children-a difficult task if the
defendant has no way to ascertain the origin of a particular image.' 68
While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality
of the PROTECT Act, it will soon render an opinion. On October 30,
2007, the Court heard oral arguments in United States v. Williams.169
Williams was prosecuted under the PROTECT Act's possession 70 and
pandering 171 provisions after sending hyperlinks to child pornography in
an online chat room. 172 Williams pleaded guilty but on appeal, urged
that his conviction was invalid because the PROTECT Act's pandering
provision is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 173 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed and held the PROTECT Act unconstitutional. 174 On certi-
orari to the Supreme Court, the government argued that the PROTECT
Act is neither vague nor overbroad because it only prohibits speech that
is not protected by the First Amendment. 175 Additionally, the govern-
ment contended that the Act's pandering provision is valid because it
166 Id.
167 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(I)(A)-(B), (2).
168 See id. § 2252A(c); see also Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255-56.
169 See Supreme Court o the United States October Term 2007, available at http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalNovember
2007.pdf
170 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
171 Id. at § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
172 See United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1288-89 (1 1th Cir. 2006), cert granted,
127 S.Ct. 1874 (2007).
173 See id. at 1289.
174 See id. at 1308-09.
175 See id. at 1303-05.
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requires intent and that the law is necessary to combat child
pornography. 7
6
While it is not yet clear how the Court will rule, the constitutionality
of the PROTECT Act remains uncertain for numerous reasons. Notably,
the difficulties in establishing the affirmative defense and the burden
placed on the defendant in doing so raise questions of due process.' 77
Further, the statute's prohibition of virtual child pornography that is "vir-
tually indistinguishable" from actual pornography raises concerns similar
to those expressed by the Court in Free Speech Coalition.178 In light of
the questionable validity of the PROTECT Act and the ever-changing
battlefield of child pornography prosecutions, 179 treating virtual child
pornography as a form of obscenity remains a feasible and effective ap-
proach. In fact, along with the PROTECT Act, Congress proposed a
resolution that called for aggressive enforcement of existing federal ob-
scenity laws.180 While this bill was never enacted, it reflects Congres-
sional awareness that obscenity law may serve as a worthy tool in the
war against child pornography. 81
IV. TREATING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AS A FORM
OF OBSCENITY
A. DOES THE SHOE FIT?
While the Court in Free Speech Coalition refused to treat virtual
child pornography as a category of speech wholly undeserving of First
Amendment protection, 182 the Court has firmly held that obscene speech
is subject to outright bans. 183 As noted in Part II, the Court in Miller v.
California announced that speech may be prohibited as obscenity if the
average person applying contemporary community standards would find
that the work, taken as a whole, (1) appeals to the prurient interest, (2)
contains depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct that are patently
offensive, and (3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
176 See id.
177 See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255 ("The Government raises serious constitu-
tional difficulties by seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of proving his speech is
not unlawful.").
178 See id.
179 See United States. v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
requisite mens rea for child pornography offenses).
180 See H.R. Con. Res. 445, 107th Cong. (2002) ("Whereas vigorous enforcement of ob-
scenity laws can help reduce the amount of 'virtual child pornography' now readily available
to sexual predators .. it is the sense of Congress that the Federal obscenity laws should be
vigorously enforced throughout the United States.").
181 See id.
182 See 535 U.S. at 236.
183 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).
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value. 184 While Miller permits prohibitions on the production and distri-
bution of obscenity, 185 Stanley v. Georgia ruled that the government may
not prohibit possession of obscenity. 86 Thus, while all virtual pornogra-
phy could ostensibly constitute obscenity, the possession of obscene vir-
tual pornography cannot be regulated under a statute prohibiting
obscenity. 187
Notwithstanding that complication, however, it may be useful to ex-
amine whether virtual child pornography constitutes obscenity under the
Miller standard. 188 First, the term "contemporary community standards"
must be defined in relation the internet, a geographically unbounded ter-
rain. 189 While the Court had previously rejected a national standard, it
upheld the application of community standards online in Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union, where the National Coalition for Sexual
Freedom and Photographers brought suit alleging that such a community
standard was unconstitutional under Miller.190 The Court recognized
that refusal to permit national standards online would make regulation of
illegal expression online impossible, and further, noted that publishers of
internet content knowingly choose a medium that reaches across state
lines. 191 Thus, a national contemporary community standard governing
virtual child pornography will not invalidate a statute prohibiting virtual
child pornography as a form of obscenity.192
Second, Miller requires that a work, taken as a whole, appeals to a
prurient interest. 193 While modern society embraces various forms of
sexual expression, meaning perhaps that the scope of the "prurient inter-
est" is fairly limited, 194 it would seem that if anything fits that category it
is a lurid fascination with children. However, virtual images of children
that appeal to pedophiles may appear innocent to the average person.
Thus, a picture's prurient appeal may be subjective and may not be rec-
ognized under the Miller standard. 9  Inherent in the very nature of most
184 Id. at 24.
185 See id. at 36-37.
186 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
187 See id.
188 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
189 See id. at 30-33. The Court in Miller noted that the American adversary system has
traditionally allowed triers of fact to defer to the standards of their community, and that to
require a State to adhere to a national community standard would be "an exercise in futility."
Id. at 30. Further, the Court recognized that "[pleople of different States vary in their tastes
and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniform-
ity." Id. at 33.
190 535 U.S. 564, 564 (2002).
191 See id. at 576-77.
192 See id.
193 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
194 Id.
195 See id.
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child pornography, and especially virtual child pornography given that is
created with pedophiles in mind, however, is its prurient appeal and con-
sequently, this prong of Miller arguably does not obstruct treatment of
virtual child pornography as obscene speech.' 96
Third, Miller demands that images depict patently offensive sexual
conduct. Like prurient appeal, patently offensive sexual conduct is ar-
guably part and parcel of child pornography. This category is character-
ized by indisputable repugnancy, and as a result, this prong of Miller will
usually be easily satisfied. 197 Furthermore, the Court in Free Speech Co-
alition clearly noted that the apparent ages of the individuals depicted in
pornography are relevant to whether or not community standards are of-
fended, suggesting that depictions of children would not be required to
reach the same level of offensiveness as depictions of adults would in
order to meet the "patently offensive" standard. 198
Fourth and finally, Miller requires that a work lack serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.' 99 As a preliminary matter, it is un-
likely that computer-generated virtual child pornography could ever have
any serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value given that it is
created and traded with pedophiles' libidos in mind.200 However, even if
such images did arguably contain such value, it is unlikely that that value
could be enough to give them constitutional protection. 20' Additionally,
this prong of the obscenity standard reasonably ensures that treatment of
virtual child pornography as obscenity is not overbroad in that main-
stream film, scientific manuals and legitimate artwork would be exempt
under this category because such works have serious artistic or scientific
value. 202
While, as the Court pointed out in Free Speech Coalition, all mate-
rial that is technically "virtual child pornography" may not constitute ob-
scenity, 20 3 all material that the Government seeks to prohibit as child
196 Id. at 24-25. The Court, in describing "patent offense," gave examples that demon-
strated, but did not exhaust, the meaning of the term, specifically "representations or descrip-
tions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated" or "representation [sic]
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id. at
25.
197 Furthermore, Miller does not require statutes to include the language of the obscenity
standard, rather it is enough that the statute describe the type of material the State finds pa-
tently offensive. See id. at 24.
198 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).
199 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
200 Id.
201 See id.
202 Id.; see also Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 247-48.
203 See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 246. Under the CPPA, the Court found that pic-
tures in psychology literature, as well as films depicting the horrors of sexual abuse were
prohibited. Id. Further, the Court noted that pictures of what appear to be 17 year-olds partici-
pating in sexually explicit activity "do not in every case contravene community standards." Id.
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pornography is considered obscene. In fact, much of the difficulty in reg-
ulating child pornography may stem from difficulty in articulating what
precisely "child pornography" connotes. 2°4 Thus, the Miller obscenity
test-a flexible, value-laden standard-is an ideal vehicle for identifying
and prohibiting dangerous forms of virtual child pornography. 205
B. OBSCENITY LAW SHOULD REACH POSSESSION OF VIRTUAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY.
While the vast majority of computer-generated virtual pornography
satisfies the demands of Miller,206 prohibition of possession of virtual
child pornography remains problematic given Stanley's refusal to extend
obscenity prohibitions to possession offenses. 20 7 Therefore, prohibition
of the possession of obscene virtual child pornography marks the inter-
section of the Court's reasoning in Stanley and Osborne. In the former,
the Court held that "mere private possession of obscene matter cannot
constitutionally be made a crime. '208 The Court reasoned that the justifi-
cations for prohibiting the distribution and production of obscene materi-
als do not carry into the home, noting that "[i]f the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man sit-
ting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he
may watch. '209 The Court criticized Georgia's efforts to prohibit posses-
sion of obscenity as an effort to control the moral content of its residents'
thoughts.210
The Court significantly departed from Stanley's reasoning in Os-
borne211 where, after holding in Ferber that child pornography, like ob-
scenity, is unprotected speech,2 12 it ruled that the categorical ban on child
pornography may extend to possession of such materials. 213 The Os-
borne Court recognized that the government has a legitimate interest in
destroying the underground child pornography market to protect the vic-
tims of child pornography. 214 However, as in Ferber,215 the Court in
204 Technically, the phrase child pornography denotes any sexual depiction of a minor,
that is, someone under the age of 18. However, clearly society has not condemned all such
depictions and has stigmatized a narrower class of child pornography. See generally Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
205 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
206 Id. at 24.
207 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
208 Id. at 559.
209 Id. at 565.
210 Id.
211 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
212 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
213 See Osborne, 495 U.S. 103.
214 Id. at 110-11.
215 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-58 (stating that the State's interest in "safeguarding the phys-
ical and psychological well-being of a minor" is "compelling" and that legislative judgment
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Osborne stressed the State's compelling interest in safeguarding the
physical and psychological well being of children. 216 Noting Ferber's
finding that the advertising and selling of child pornography provides an
economic incentive to produce the material, the Court concluded that it is
reasonable for a state to prohibit the possession of child pornography to
reduce that incentive and thereby prevent further harm to actual chil-
dren.217 Thus, persuading the Court that harm to actual children results
from virtual child pornography may be an obstacle to getting it to pro-
hibit possession of obscene virtual material. Nevertheless, the Court in
Free Speech Coalition did hint that it would accept this connection as
genuine if made with regard to obscene virtual child pornography. 218
Given the Court's implicit willingness to allow prohibition of ob-
scene virtual child pornography 219 and its recognition of the fact that the
underground market in child pornography makes prosecution for produc-
tion and distribution difficult, 220 it remains possible that the Court will
extend its reasoning in Osborne to statutes prohibiting possession of ob-
scene virtual child pomography. 221 Additionally, prohibition of posses-
sion may be upheld because the Court's chief concern in Free Speech
Coalition, namely that the CPPA as enacted was overbroad and could
potentially reach valuable creative expression, is remedied by prohibiting
only obscene virtual depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit
activity. 222 Taken together, these interests warrant a categorical ban on
obscene virtual child pornography.
that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the psychological,
emotional, and mental health of the child easily passes muster under the First Amendment).
216 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109.
217 Id. at 109-10 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-58).
218 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246, 249-51 (2002). The Court
compared the reasoning of Ferber and Miller to the CPPA, concluding that neither supported
the statute. Id. In doing so, the Court suggested that if it were to find a basis in either case the
CPPA would be constitutional. Id. at 249-51. Notably, in concluding that the CPPA could
not be said to regulate obscenity because there was no link between the prohibitions contained
within the CPPA and the "affront to community standards" element of the definition of ob-
scenity, the Court did not point to Stanley's holding that possession of obscene materials can-
not be banned. See id. at 246-49.
219 See id. at 246, 249-251.
220 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110-11 ("since the time of our decision in Ferber, much of the
child pornography market has been driven underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not
impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by only attacking production and
distribution").
221 Id.
222 See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 248.
VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LEGISLATION
C. USE OF OBSCENITY LAW TO PROHIBIT VIRTUAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY MAY POSE DIFFICULTIES, BUT IT REMAINS THE
MOST FEASIBLE WAY TO COMBAT VIRTUAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY.
At least one author has opined that the use of obscenity law to pros-
ecute virtual child pornography presents complications apart from those
associated with prohibiting possession.223 Specifically, this author con-
tends that by subjecting virtual child pornography to the obscenity stan-
dard, prosecutors will be put in the difficult position of choosing whether
to prosecute what they believe to be an image of an actual child as virtual
or real. 224 This decision is a crucial one because, while a prosecutor
might easily demonstrate that a particular pornographic work is obscene,
he would face the heavy burden of proving that the image depicts an
actual child.225 Thus, the concern is that prosecutors will forego prose-
cutions of actual child pornography if they cannot identify the child and
will instead treat such cases as examples of obscene virtual child
pornography. 226
While prosecution of actual child pornography as actual child por-
nography is preferable, it remains a mere ideal given the uniformity of
virtual and real images. 227 Surely, charging images wherein the minor
cannot be identified as obscene virtual child pornography is superior to
charging such images as actual child pornography and having the defen-
dant successfully argue that there is a reasonable doubt as to the images'
authenticity given that real and virtual images are "virtually indistin-
guishable" and the minor pictured cannot be verified as real.228 While
the PROTECT Act as it stands attempts to penalize "virtually indistin-
guishable" images, the affirmative defense removes liability for posses-
sion of virtual images. 229 Although the burden rests on a defendant
charged with possession to show that the images at issue are not real, the
223 See Virginia F. Milstead, Note, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: How Can Virtual
Child Pornography be Banned Under the First Amendment?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 825, 867
(2004).
224 Id.
225 As noted, it is difficult to locate the sources of online images because the web of
internet pornography trading is tangled and difficult to track. Further, many images traded
within the United States originated in foreign countries. See Akdeniz, supra note 148; Perla,
supra note 147 at 1222-24.
226 See Milstead, supra note 223, at 853.
227 See S. REp. No. 108-2, at 4-5 (2003); see also Perla, supra note 147, at 1218; Interna-
tional Developments, supra note 148.
228 See S. REP. No. 108-2, at 4-5 (2003); Akdeniz, supra note 148; see also Perla, supra
note 147, at 1218.
229 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2003).
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mere inclusion of this exemption will substantiate a defendant's claim
that there exists a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.230
CONCLUSION
While the PROTECT Act serves as a useful resource to prosecutors
charged with combating child pornography, 23' it continues to pose con-
stitutional concerns similar to those raised by the CPPA in Free Speech
Coalition.232 Moreover, the PROTECT Act is incomplete because it
does not sufficiently prohibit virtual child pornography, 233 a category of
speech shown to cause real harm to actual children. Given these short-
comings, Congress should consider future legislation that would treat vir-
tual child pornography as a form of obscenity, a category of speech the
Supreme Court has deemed wholly undeserving of First Amendment
protection.234 Lastly, while Stanley does not permit prohibition of pos-
session of obscenity, 235 the Supreme Court should recognize that a con-
gressional ban on the production and distribution of obscene virtual child
pornography will not be effective unless possession of obscene virtual
child pornography is prohibited as well.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
233 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2003).
234 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
235 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557(1969).
